Causation, Mental Models, and the Law by Johnson-Laird, P.N.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 65
Issue 1
The Eighth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture
Article 6
9-1-1999
Causation, Mental Models, and the Law
P.N. Johnson-Laird
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
P.N. Johnson-Laird, Causation, Mental Models, and the Law, 65 Brook. L. Rev. 67 (1999).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol65/iss1/6
CAUSATION, MENTAL MODELS, AND THE LAW*
P.N. Johnson-Lairdt
"[Iln all legal systems, liability to be punished or to make
compensation frequently depends on whether actions (or omissions)
have caused harm."1
INTRODUCTION
The accused assaulted and raped a woman, who then took
poison and died either from the poison or its effects combined
with those of her wounds. Did the accused cause her death?
The defendant negligently left open an unguarded lift shaft,
and a young lad, knowing that the lift was not there, invited
the plaintiff to step into it. Did the defendant cause the
plaintiffs injuries? The defendants, manufacturers of guns,
negligently oversupplied shops in states with weak gun laws.
Criminals came into possession of such guns and murdered
relatives of the plaintiffs. Were the defendants the cause of the
homicides?
Lawyers think about causal relations, because, as these
examples show, liability can depend on causation. Lawyers
also complain that people accept mere association as evidence
*©1999 P.N. Johnson-Laird. All Rights Reserved.
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of causation.2 Of course, more is at stake in law than causal
relations, and in many cases they are irrelevant. Yet, in ordi-
nary life, we blame people because they have caused harm to
others; the law refines this notion and punishes individuals, or
makes them liable for compensation, if they are responsible.
In pioneering studies, Solan3 and Winter4 have shown
that cognitive and linguistic considerations can elucidate many
problems in legal interpretation. The aim of the present paper
is to clarify the concept of causation-the everyday notion that
underlies common law. This paper also relies on the methods
of cognitive psychology-experimentation and computer model-
ing of thought processes-to lay bare the underlying structure
of causal relations in a way that is not normally available to
legal theorists. Whether or not causation is important to the
law, however, is a matter that the paper will not assess. It will
pretend that those who seek to minimize the importance of
cause in the law are wrong. Perhaps they are wrong; however,
the pretence is warranted if the law should ultimately corre-
spond to the conceptions of the community.5
The plan of the paper is simple. Jt begins with a sketch of
a theory of how people understand and reason. This particular
theory of cognition rests on the assumption that to grasp the
meaning of a description is to envisage how the world would be
if the description were true. The mind constructs mental mod-
els of the world, and each such model corresponds to a possible
state of affairs. The paper then describes how people under-
stand causal relations. People draw a distinction in meaning
and in reasoning that is contrary both to recent probabilistic
theories6 and to a philosophical tradition going back at least to
John Stuart Mill's analysis of causation.7 The paper concludes
2 See, e.g., Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1090 (E.D. Md.
1986).
' See Lawrence Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some
Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
4 See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING HOUSE IN THE FOREST: How THE STUDY
OF THE MIND CHANGES OUR UNDERSTANDING OF LIFE AND LAW (forthcoming 2000).
' See generally P.H. ROBINSON & J.M. DARLEY, JUSTICE LIABILITY, AND BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
6 See, e.g., P. SUPPES, PROBABILISTIC METAPHYSICS (1984).
7 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC (J.M. Robson ed.,
University of Toronto Press 1973) (1843).
[Vol. 65: 1
CAUSATION, MENTAL MODELS, AND THE LAW
with an account of how the newly revealed structure of causa-
tion may elucidate some legal puzzles.
As Hume remarked, reasoning about matters of fact is
largely based on causal relations.8 Theorists in many disci-
plines have studied how humans think about causal relations,
but they have yet to agree on a theory of that process. Scholars
also disagree about the meaning of causal claims and their
philosophical underpinnings. Our concern is not with philo-
sophical problems-that is, with whether causal relations are
objective states in the world or subjective notions in the mind,
or with whether causal relations hold between facts, events,
objects, or states of affairs. In fact, causes can concern events
and also states of affairs, e.g., as Benjamin Franklin wrote,
"for want of a nail the shoe was lost."9 And so this paper uses
the neutral expression, "states," to embrace physical or psycho-
logical events, situations, facts, and other potential arguments
of causal relations. We pass over these fine philosophical dis-
tinctions, not because they are unimportant, but because their
proper analysis would take us too far afield from this paper's
main concerns.
I. THE THEORY OF MENTAL MODELS
How do human beings reason? One answer, which goes
back to the Enlightenment, and which still has many adher-
ents, is that humans follow the laws of thought." These laws
are made explicit in formal logic, the probability calculus, and
the theory of rational decision making. Undoubtedly, people
can acquire such laws and even use them to solve difficult
problems. The question at issue, however, is whether naive
individuals, i.e., those with no training in formal calculi, un-
consciously follow the laws of thought. They certainly are not
aware of following such laws. They cannot describe them. And
several sorts of observation imply that they are not following
- See D. HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMN UNDERSTANDING (A. Flew
ed., 1988).
9 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANACK (1758), quoted in JOHN
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 347 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980).
1o See, e.g., MENTAL LOGIC (M.D.S. Braine & D.P. O'Brien eds., 1998).
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them. One such observation is that people make errors in rea-
soning. Here is an example based on Alan Dershowitz's pre-
sentation at the O.J. Simpson trial:
If a man batters his partner, then he is unlikely to murder her. The
FBI reports only about 1500 such cases out of four million cases of
battery. Therefore, if a man murders his partner, then he is unlikely
to have battered her. "Battery, as such, is not a good independent
predictor of murder."1'
The error will be explained later.
Sporadic errors in reasoning hardly refute the doctrine of
the laws of thought, but what is embarrassing are systematic
and predictable errors. The laws of thought, by definition, do
not allow for them. The laws yield only valid inferences, so
whatever errors occur should be sporadic and haphazard-a
result of a contingent "accident in the mind" rather than basic
principles. In fact, experiments carried out in the psychological
laboratory show that people do make systematic and predict-
able mistakes in reasoning. Before discussion of such studies,
we will first consider the theory of mental models, because it is
this theory that predicted the errors.
The theory of mental models has its origins in a conjecture
made more than fifty years ago by a prescient Scottish psychol-
ogist, the late Kenneth Craik."2 He suggested that the mind
builds small-scale models of the world, which it uses to antici-
pate events and to guide its decisions. Mental models are con-
structed as a result of perceiving the world, understanding
descriptions, and imagining possibilities. This modern theory of
mental models adds three important assumptions: 3
1. Each mental model represents a possibility, and its structure
corresponds to the structure of what it represents. For example, a
model of a set of individuals, such as some lawyers in a court, con-
sists in a set of mental tokens, where each token corresponds to an
individual.
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 104-05 (1996).
12 See KENNETH CRAIK, THE NATURE OF EXPLANATION (1943).
13 See P.N. JOHNSON-LAIRD, MENTAL MODELS: TOWARDS A COGNITIVE SCIENCE
OF LANGUAGE, INFERENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS (1983); P.N. JOHNSON-LAIERD &
R.M.J. BYRNE, DEDUCTION (1991).
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2. Mental models normally represent what is true, and not what
is false. This postulate is so important that it is dignified with a
name: the principle of truth.
3. A set of models may concern what is physically possible, what
is permissible, or what is logically possible.
Reasoning calls for individuals to envisage the state of
affairs corresponding to some starting point-a set of verbal
premises, some piece of general knowledge, a visual observa-
tion, an assumption made for the sake of argument, or some
admixture of them. To make matters simple, this paper refers
henceforth to this starting point as "the premises," but readers
should bear in mind that they may have a varied provenance.
An inference is logically valid if its conclusion must be true
given that its premises are true. While there is no guarantee
that the conclusion of a valid inference is true, it will be true
provided that its premises are true. If its premises are false,
the conclusion may, or may not, be true.
The model theory provides a unified account of various
sorts of reasoning. A conclusion is necessary-it must be the
case-if it holds in all the models of the premises; it is possi-
ble--it may be the case-if it holds in at least one of the models;
and its probability-assuming that each model is
equiprobable-depends on the proportion of models in which it
holds.
The theory can be illustrated by a simple inference. Con-
sider the following problem:
The battery was either dead or else the starter did not work.
In fact, the battery was not dead.
What follows?
The first premise, which is an exclusive disjunction, is consis-
tent with two possibilities:
dead
,work
Each line in this diagram denotes a separate mental model
corresponding to a separate possibility, and so "dead" denotes a
model of the battery as dead. The symbol "-," denotes negation,
"work" denotes a model of the starter as working, and so
"-'work" denotes a model of the starter as not working. Actual
mental models can take the form of visual images or complex
abstract structures, but we do not need to represent these de-
19991
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tails here. More importantly, the first model represents the
truth of the proposition that the battery was dead, but it does
not represent that it is false that the starter did not work, i.e.,
the starter did work. People try to make mental footnotes
about what is false, but, as we will see, they soon forget them.
The second premise eliminates the first model, and so the con-
clusion that follows corresponds to the second model:
The starter did not work.
This conclusion is valid, i.e., it is necessarily true given that
the premises are true, and its validity is established by show-
ing that it holds in all possible models of the premises. In this
case, of course, there is only one model of both premises.
Suppose that we were to construct models that represent
both what is true and what is false. The result, which our
computer program works out for us, is a set of fully explicit
models. They tell us what the correct conclusions are from a
set of premises. In principle, people can construct fully explicit
models if they can remember their mental footnotes about
what is false. They can use the footnotes to flesh out mental
models in order to turn them into fully explicit models. Hence,
the mental models above of the exclusive disjunction can be
fleshed out into fully explicit models:
dead work
-dead -'work
All the theory's predictions about reasoning derive from
the preceding account. The last twenty years has seen an accu-
mulation of experimental evidence corroborating mental mod-
els, and over 250 papers have been published about them.14 A
major experimental result is that reasoners soon forget about
what is false, especially with complex premises, and so they
make egregious errors. Inferences that depend on a greater
number of mental models are more difficult, taking longer and
leading to more errors. Erroneous conclusions tend to corre-
spond to individual mental models of premises. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to review the evidence, but it is appropriate
4 See Mental Models in Reasoning (visited Aug. 20, 1999)
<http:J/www.tcd.ie/Psychology/Ruth-Byrnefmental-models> (webpage developed by
Ruth Byrne and her colleagues at Trinity College, Dublin).
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to show how the model theory explains errors in probabilistic
reasoning, such as the error in the inference about battering
and murder.
The model theory's representation of a conditional of the
form:
If he battered his partner then he murdered her,
calls for models of the following form:
Batter Murder
where the ellipsis represents those possibilities in which the
antecedent of the conditional, he battered his partner, is false.
Thus, the ellipsis is really a "place holder" representing possi-
bilities that people do not normally think about. But, if
pushed, they may be able to make them explicit. Given that it
is false that he battered his partner, he may or may not have
murdered her, and so the fully explicit models of the condition-
al above are:
Batter Murder
-Batter Murder
-Batter Murder
The mental models of the conditional resemble those of the
converse conditional:
If he murdered his partner then he battered her,
which are of the form:
Murder Batter
The theory accordingly predicts that individuals will readily
confuse the two assertions.
They are also likely to confuse analogous assertions about
conditional probabilities. It may be true, as data from the FBI
suggest:
If a man battered his partner, then he is unlikely to have murdered
her (less than one case per 1000 cases of battery in 1992).
But, this claim is compatible with the falsity of the converse
conditional:
If a man murdered his partner, then he is unlikely to have battered
her.
1999]
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With no further information, other than the assumption that
there are, say, tens of thousands of couples who live together
amicably (without battery or murder), we could fill in the set of
fully explicit models in a variety of ways. One way conforms
with the truth of the preceding conditional:
Frequencies
Batter Murder 1
Batter -'Murder 999
-Batter Murder 99
-,Batter -'Murder 44,901
This distribution of frequencies shows that if a man murdered
his partner (the first and third rows), then he is most unlikely
to have battered her (one case out of a 100 murders). But the
data could equally well turn out to be as follows:
Batter Murder 1
Batter -'Murder 999
-Batter Murder 1
-Batter -'Murder 44,999
It is still true that:
If a man battered his partner, then he is unlikely to have murdered
her (one chance in a thousand).
But, the claim that:
If a man murdered his partner, then he is unlikely to have battered
her,
is utterly false. Indeed, the data show that given that a man
murdered his partner (the first and third rows), there is a 50%
chance that he battered her.
This cautionary tale has several morals. Reasoning about
probabilities is difficult: we all make mistakes. None of us
appears to be unconsciously equipped with the laws of the
probability calculus. We often fail to realize that the condition-
al probability of one state A given another state B tells us
nothing about the converse conditional probability of B given
A. The secret for obtaining the right answer is to work out all
the possibilities-to construct their fully explicit models-and to
use the evidence at hand to fill in their frequencies of occur-
rence. If it is impossible to fill in the numbers completely, then
we should beware of assertions about the probability of one
state given another. But once we have filled in the fully explic-
[Vol. 65: 1
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it possibilities with their frequencies, we know all that we
need to know in order to work out any probability concerning
the states. An analogous method is also the secret to working
out the correct causal relations among states.
II. THE MEANING OF CAUSAL RELATIONS
There are three main sorts of causal assertion:
1. General causal assertions, such as:
Depriving a patient's brain of oxygen for five minutes causes death.
2. Singular causal assertions where the outcome is known,
such as:
Depriving this patient's brain of oxygen for five minutes caused
his death.
3. Singular causal assertions where the outcome is not known,
such as:
Depriving this patient's brain of oxygen for five minutes will cause
his death.
The first assumption of the model theory of causal relations is
that they concern possibilities:
Given two states of affairs, A and B, the meaning of a causal rela-
tion between them concerns what is possible and what is impossible
in their co-occurrence.
The second assumption is that B does not precede A in time:
Given two states of affairs, A and B, if A has a causal influence on
B, then B does not precede A in time.
This principle allows, as Kant observed, that a cause can be
contemporaneous with its effect. 5 For example, squeezing the
toothpaste tube can occur at the same time that the toothpaste
comes out of the tube. The meanings of causal relations do not
call for action on contact because it is entirely proper to make
causal claims relating distant states of affairs:
The moon causes the tides.
"s See generally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (J.M.D.
Meiklejohn trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1934) (1781).
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The law is usually concerned with singular causal asser-
tions, and so we will focus on them. A singular causal asser-
tion where the outcome is not known, A will cause B, has three
fully explicit models, which each represent a possibility:
1. a b
-a b
-a b
These possibilities underlie the notion that A is sufficient for B
to occur, that is, the causal relation is a weak one allowing for
other causes of B. An example of this sort of weak causation is:
Increasing the amount he eats will cause him to gain weight,
because he can also gain weight, for example, as a result of
exercising less. The claim, A will cause B, is false in case A
occurs without B:
a b
A singular causal assertion where the outcome is known, A
caused B, has a model of the factual situation, and alternative
models representing counterfactual possibilities:
a b (the factual case)
-'a b (a counterfactual possibility)
-'a -'b (a counterfactual possibility)
A counterfactual possibility is a state that was once possible
but that did not, in fact, occur.16 A caused B is false, of course,
if either A or B did not occur. But, it can be false even when
both A and B occurred, if the relation between them was not
causal. Here the counterfactual possibilities are critical. If they
include a case in which A occurred without B, then A did not
cause B.
There are a variety of other causal relations, and each of
them can occur in general and singular assertions. For simplic-
ity, however, we consider only their occurrences as singular
causal relations with unknown outcomes. The relation A will
'" See, e.g., R.M.J. Byrne, Cognitive Processes in Counterfactual Thinking About
What Might Have Been, in 37 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION,
ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 105-54 (D.KI Medin ed., 1997).
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prevent B means that the occurrence of A will cause B not to
occur. It has the following fully explicit models:
2. a -b
-a b
-'a b
An assertion of the form A will allow B, such as:
Taking the short cut will allow you to avoid the traffic,
has a strong implicature that not taking the short cut will not
allow you to avoid the traffic. An implicature is an inference
that is warranted b pragmatic considerations.'7 Hence, indi-
viduals who speak in an informative way would not utter the
remark above if they knew that you could just as well avoid
the traffic by not taking the short cut. Thus, the models of A
will allow B and its implicature have the form:
3. a b
a b
-a -b
These possibilities underlie the notion that A is necessary for B
to occur. An assertion of the form:
A will not allow B,
and its implicature have the following models:
4. a -'b
a b
-a b
It is sometimes important to distinguish between meaning and
implicature, but in what follows we will not attempt to keep
them apart.
The preceding relations are weak because they are consis-
tent with three possibilities. In addition, however, there are
two strong causal relations consistent with only two possibili-
ties. A and only A will cause B has the following models:
5. a b
-a -b
"7 See H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS (P.
Cole & J.L. Morgan eds., 1975).
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And A and only A will prevent B has the following models:
6. a -b
-a b
An example of strong causation is:
Too much alcohol will cause him to get drunk,
because drunkenness has no other cause.
The preceding analysis of the meanings of causal relations
is in terms of fully explicit models. The principle of truth, how-
ever, predicts that naive individuals will tend to rely on the
corresponding mental models for each of the causal relations.
An assertion of the form:
A will cause B,
like the analogous assertion, If A then B, calls for the mental
models:
a b
in which there is only an implicit model representing the possi-
bilities in which the antecedent, A, is false. There is a mental
footnote to capture this information, and given the footnote, it
is possible to flesh out the models fully explicitly as:
a b
-'a b
-a -b
where B occurs in the absence of A.
The theory postulates that individuals normally reason on
the basis of mental models, but with simple assertions of the
present sort, they can appreciate that A will cause B is com-
patible with B having other causes. Given time, they may even
enumerate the explicit possibilities. Strong causation as ex-
pressed by A and only A will cause B has the same mental
models as weak causation, but the mental footnote indicates
that the only way to flesh out the models fully explicitly is as:
a b
-'a -'b
Table 1 summarizes the mental models of the six singular
causal relations together with their fully explicit models. The
same models stand for general causal assertions, but each row
[Vol. 65: 1
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then represents an alternative state within the same situation.
The existence of several sorts of causal relation may come as a
surprise to the reader. Philosophers have often assumed that
there is only a single relation of cause and effect-an oversight
that according to Hesslow 8 has led them into difficulties.
Table 1 - The models for six singular causal relations. The central
column shows the mental models normally used by human reason-
ers, and the right-hand column shows the fully explicit models,
which represent the false components of the true cases using nega-
tions that are true: "-" denotes negation and ".. f denotes a wholly
implicit model. The mental models for the strong and weak relations
of cause and prevention differ only in their mental footnotes (see
text).
Connective Mental Models Fully Explicit Models
1. A will cause A B A B
B: ... -A B
-A -B
2. A will pre- A -'B A -'B
vent B: ... -A B
-A -B
3. A will allow A B A B
B: ... A -'B
-A -'B
4. A will allow A -B A -'B
not B: ... A B
-A B
5. A and only A B A B
A will cause ... -'A -'B
B:
6. A and only A -'B A -'B
A will pre- ... -'A B
vent B:
There is no causal relation if A or B is bound to occur, or
bound not to occur, and experiments show that naive individu-
" See G. Hesslow, The Problem of Causal Selection, in CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE
AND NATURAL EXPLANATION: COMMONSENSE CONCEPTIONS OF CAUSALITY 11-32 (D.J.
Hilton ed., 1988).
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als concur with this claim. If all you know is that B is bound to
occur if A occurs, then you are not entitled to make any causal
claim about the relation between them. On the one hand, B
may also be bound to occur even if A does not occur, i.e., there
are only the following possibilities:
a b
-la b
Thus, it would be wrong to invoke any causal relation between
A and B in this case. On the other hand, even if there is a
causal relation between the two, you do not know whether A is
a strong or weak cause of B. Yevgeniya Goldvarg and I have
carried out experiments in which naive individuals had to list
what was possible and what was impossible given various
causal relations. The results corroborated the model theory. No
participant balked at the task, and most of them were able to
generate fully explicit models, distinguishing among the vari-
ous causal relations, and between causing and allowing.
III. DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES FROM CAUSAL RELATIONS
Some theorists suppose that causes can be neither ob-
served nor deduced, and so they are only induced. But the
causal status of an observation can be deduced from a knowl-
edge of its circumstances. For example, suppose you know that
a certain anesthetic causes a loss of consciousness, and you
observe that a patient who is given the anesthetic loses con-
sciousness. You can deduce that the anesthetic caused the
patient to lose consciousness.
How do you make causal deductions? One answer is that
you rely on the laws of thought, that is, formal rules of infer-
ence of some sort. Another answer, however, is that you rely
[Vol. 65: 1
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on mental models. Given the appropriate temporal constraints
and the following set of possibilities:
a b c
-,a -b c
-a b -c
you validly infer:
A will cause C,
because the set contains each of the possibilities required for
this relation. In practice, as Goldvarg and I have shown experi-
mentally, naive individuals tend to rely, not on fully explicit
models, but on mental models.' 9 For example, given a problem
of the form:
A prevents B.
B causes C.
What, if anything, follows?
Most people drew the conclusion:
A prevents C.
The mental models of the premises support this conclusion, but
the fully explicit models show that it is wrong: there is no
causal relation between A and C. In general, when naive indi-
viduals make a causal inference, they tend to err when there is
a discrepancy between the conclusion supported by the mental
models of the premises and the conclusion supported by the
fully explicit models of the premises. They tend to draw the
conclusion corresponding to the mental models.
The most striking result depends on an unexpected predic-
tion. Because mental models fail to represent what is false,
they yield grossly erroneous conclusions from certain premises.
These premises give rise to illusory inferences, i.e., most people
draw one and the same conclusion, which seems obvious, and
yet which is wrong. Such illusory inferences occur in other
domains of reasoning. These illusory inferences provide a
'9 See Table 1.
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strong support for the model theory, because they are contrary
to theories of reasoning based on the "laws of thought." As an
example, consider the following problem:
One of these assertions is true and one of them is false:
Marrying Pat will cause Viv to relax.
Not marrying Pat will cause Viv to relax.
The following assertion is definitely true:
Viv will marry Pat.
Will Viv relax?
The mental models of the disjunction of the first two premises
are as follows:
Marry Relax
-'Marry Relax
and so it seems that Viv is bound to relax. But, these models
fail to represent what is false, i.e., when the first premise is
true, the second premise is false, and vice versa. For example,
if it is false that marrying Pat will cause Viv to relax, then Viv
will not relax even though Viv marries Pat:
Marry -Relax
Hence, the premises do not imply that Viv will relax. The con-
clusion is an illusion. Nearly everyone succumbs to illusory
inferences, and thereby corroborates the model theory.
IV. HART AND HONoRt's THEORY OF CAUSATION
Hart and Honor6's classic book, CAUSATION IN THE LAW,20
which was originally published in 1959, describes a theory of
causation that is incompatible with the previous account based
on models of possibilities. Many theorists have argued that
some causal power or mechanism over and above what can be
captured in possibilities somehow links causes to effects. Like-
wise, a central component of Hart and Honor6's analysis is
that singular causal assertions rely implicitly on general caus-
al claims. They write:
even singular causal statements which appear to be confined to the
connection between two particular occurrences are in fact covertly
general; their causal character is derivative and lies wholly in the
20 See HART & HONORt, supra note 1.
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fact that the particular events with which they are concerned exem-
plify some generalization asserting that kinds or classes of events
are invariably connected.21
Certainly, such generalizations often exist, and they can play a
crucial role when individuals induce a causal relation from
observations or assess whether a singular causal assertion is
true. But they are not part of the meaning of causation. Asser-
tions that explicitly deny the existence of general principles are
not self-contradictory, e.g.:
Psychokinesis caused the bias in the random-number generator,
though it did not exemplify any general relation and how it had
such an effect is in principle inexplicable.
The assertion may be false, but it is not a self-contradiction, as
it would be if the meaning of causes entailed a background
generalization.
Hart and Honor6 do not explicitly distinguish between
causing and allowing (i.e. so-called "enabling conditions"), but
they distinguish between causes and what they refer to as
"mere conditions."22 Their argument, which is similar to
Mill's, 3 can be illustrated by an example of a singular cause.
Consider an explosion that is caused by the occurrence of a
spark in a container of combustible vapor. The explosion would
not have occurred in the absence of the spark, and it would not
have occurred in the absence of the vapor. Hence, both the
spark and the vapor appear to be individually necessary and
jointly sufficient to cause the explosion. Yet people normally
speak of the spark as the cause of the explosion and the pres-
ence of the vapor as the enabling condition that allows it to
occur. Likewise, the abseice of the vapor would be a disabling
condition that would not allow the explosion to occur. If the
difference between causes and enabling conditions cannot be
accounted for in terms of logic or meaning, then what distin-
guishes the two? Mill himself thought that in everyday life, the
choice of a cause was often capricious, but he did offer some
more systematic answers, as have many authors. Thus, Hart
and Honor6 argue that when individuals identify single causes,
they choose the unusual or abnormal factor as the cause-the
2, Id. at 10.
22 Id. at 12.
2' See generally MILL, supra note 7.
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spark rather than the vapor in the example above or else they
choose a voluntary human action.24 There are many other
schools of thought on this issue. Some say that the cause is the
exceptional event, some say it is inconstant whereas the en-
abling conditions are constant, some say the cause is the factor
that is relevant in explanations, and so on.
All these accounts could be true, but in contrast to them,
the model theory draws a distinction in meaning and logic
between causes and enabling conditions. Hence, this point is a
crux for the model theory to which we will return in the next
section. Meanwhile, we address a more general doubt about
the model theory: is there really nothing more to the meaning
of causal relations than possibilities and the temporal con-
straint that an effect does not precede its cause?
One doubt is that the mere existence of the relevant set of
possibilities satisfying the temporal constraint does not suffice
for a causal relation in certain instances. Granted the following
two alternative possibilities, for example:
Divisible by two Even
Not divisible by two Not even
you do not assert:
Being divisible by two causes a number to be even,
but rather:
Being divisible by two necessarily implies that a number is even.
The domain is one of logical possibilities rather than physical
possibilities. Likewise, the following alternative possibilities
exist in a New Jersey bar:
Over the age of 18 Drinks alcohol
Over the age of 18 Does not drink alcohol
Not over the age of 18 Does not drink alcohol
Yet you do not assert:
Being over the age of 18 enables a customer to drink alcohol,
but rather:
Being over the age of 18 makes it permissible for a customer to
drink alcohol.
24 See HART & HONOR, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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The domain is one of deontic possibilities rather than physical
possibilities, that is, someone may, in fact, drink alcohol under
the age of 18, but it would violate what is permissible. Causal,
logical, and deontic claims all relate to possibilities, but the
domain within which they hold (physical vs. inferential vs.
deontic) yields the difference between them.
Yet, even in domains concerning physical possibilities,
could there be cases that satisfy the model theory but that are
not causal? Consider, for example, the relation between day
and night: it is not possible to have day without night follow-
ing closely on its heels. Or so it seems. Yet, day does not cause
night. Hence, surely something is wrong with our analysis, and
more is at stake than mere possibilities. Echoing Hart and
Honor6's claim for background generalizations, theorists argue
that what is missing is an explanation of the circumstanc-
es-day is a consequence of the sun shining on the earth, and,
as the earth rotates, so day in a part of the earth gives way to
night. Thus, the correlation between day and night is ex-
plained in terms of a common underlying cause. A corollary of
this account is that we can envisage a possibility in which day
is not followed by night: you need only orbit the earth at a
speed that counteracts the effects of the earth's rotation, and
you will live in perpetual day. This possibility refutes the caus-
al claim that day causes night. We conclude that the invoca-
tion of explanatory principles and generalizations is a useful
way-perhaps the only way in many cases-to infer causation
from correlation, but the resulting conclusion of a causal rela-
tion means no more than that a certain set of temporally-or-
dered possibilities obtains.
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V. CAUSE, ENABLING CONDITIONS, AND CIRCUMSTANCE
Suppose a witness testifies that the following sequence of
events occurred:
The doctor injected a drug into the patient and the patient lost con-
sciousness.
What is the causal relation, if any, between the two events?
The observation is inconsistent with two of the six possible
causal relations: the injection did not prevent loss of conscious-
ness in either the strong or weak sense. But, it is compatible
with any of the four remaining relations and, of course, with
the lack of any causal relation. A corollary of this uncertainty
is that the mere observation of a particular sequence of states
never suffices to establish a unique causal relation between
them. Causal relations are modal. They are not merely about
what occurred but also about what might have occurred. What
might have occurred, however, cannot be determined merely
from observation. It depends on a knowledge of the circum-
stances, i.e., the set of possibilities. The model theory accord-
ingly postulates:
Causal interpretation depends on how people conceive the circum-
stances of states, that is, on the particular states that they consider
to be possible, whether real, hypothetical, or counterfactual.
Hart and Honor4 had an analogous idea in mind when they
talked of the "context" of a cause,' and other theorists have
invoked similar ideas. The circumstantial principle, however,
implies that individuals use their general knowledge and their
knowledge of the state of affairs at issue to generate a set of
mental models. Each model represents a possibility, and, in
the case of a singular causal claim about a fact, one model
represents the actual state of affairs. The models represent
what a person takes to be the relevant possibilities in the cir-
cumstances, and they determine what the person judges to be
the appropriate causal relation.
25 Id. at 35.
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To return to the example, if the circumstances are as fol-
lows:
injection loss-of-consciousness
-injection loss-of-consciousness
-injection -iloss-of-consciousness
an appropriate description is:
The injection caused the patient to lose consciousness.
If the circumstances are as follows:
injection loss-of-consciousness
injection -loss-of-consciousness
-injection -loss-of-consciousness
an appropriate description is:
The injection allowed the patient to lose consciousness.
And if the circumstances are as follows:
injection loss-of-consciousness
injection loss-of-consciousness
,injection loss-of-consciousness
an appropriate description is:
The injection did not prevent the patient from losing consciousness.
What are the correct circumstances of a state of affairs?
There may be no definite way to decide. That is why they be-
devil both legal and philosophical analyses of causation. For
example, inferences of the form known as "strengthening the
antecedent" are valid in many circumstances:
A causes C.
:.A and B cause C.
This inference, for example, is unexceptional:
Putting sugar in your tea causes it to taste sweet.
:.Putting sugar in your tea and putting some milk in too causes it to
taste sweet.
In contrast, the following inference is unacceptable:
Putting sugar in your tea causes it to taste sweet.
:.Putting sugar in your tea and putting some diesel oil in too causes it
to taste sweet.
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The circumstances of the conclusion are no longer those of the
premises. The case is altered; the conclusion is false even if the
premise is true.
The model theory distinguishes between causing an effect
and allowing it to occur, that is, between causes and enabling
conditions. Yet, theorists such as Mill and Hart and Honor6
deny that there is any logical or semantic distinction between
the two. Hence, an apparent paradox needs to be resolved. We
will show that the circumstances of states do indeed resolve
the controversy: causing is logically distinct from allowing. And
we will spell out why Mill's argument seemed compelling to
Hart, Honor6, and to their peers.
We argued earlier that there is a difference in meaning
between A will cause B and A will allow B. The difference is
borne out by their logical consequences. For example, suppose
that the following proposition is true:
Taking bichloride of mercury will cause her to die,
and that the causal antecedent is true:
She takes bichloride of mercury.
You can draw the valid conclusion:
She will die.
In contrast, suppose that the following proposition is true:
Not taking bichloride of mercury will allow her to live,
and that the enabling antecedent is true:
She does not take bichloride of mercury.
You can draw only the weak conclusion:
She may live.
It follows that the two sorts of relation are logically distinct.
Granted the distinction, why should anyone ever have
assumed that causes and enabling conditions are logically
indistinguishable? The answer comes from the subtle effects of
knowledge in determining the circumstances of an effect. Con-
sider, again, the example that we used to illustrate Mill's argu-
ment. A spark in a combustible vapor causes an explosion. You
know that in the presence of the vapor, the spark causes the
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explosion, and that in the absence of either the vapor or the
spark, there is no explosion. Your knowledge accordingly yields
the circumstances shown in the following models:
vapor spark explosion
vapor -spark -explosion
,vapor spark -%explosion
-ivapor -ispark -iexplosion
In these circumstances, the roles of the spark and vapor are
equivalent. Jointly, they are the strong cause of the explosion.
You can envisage other circumstances, however. Suppose,
for example, that a tank is used to store gasoline, and at pres-
ent it may or may not contain a combustible vapor. If it does
contain the vapor then the spark (or, say, a naked flame) will
cause an explosion. The circumstances are shown in the follow-
ing models:
vapor spark explosion
vapor -spark explosion
vapor -ispark -iexplosion
-qvapor spark -iexplosion
-vapor -spark -explosion
The respective probabilities of each of these possibilities can
make one antecedent normal and the other antecedent abnor-
mal, but they have no bearing on their causal roles.2" What
matters is that their respective roles are logically distinct in
the circumstances. In these models, the relation between the
vapor and the explosion is as follows:
vapor explosion
vapor -,explosion
-ivapor -explosion
Hence, the vapor allows the explosion to occur. In contrast, the
spark and the explosion occur in all possibilities in the models
above:
spark explosion
spark -explosion
,spark explosion
nspark -explosion
26 But see HART & HONOR, supra note 1.
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There is no causal relation here between spark and explosion,
but the original set of models of the circumstances shows that
the presence of the vapor enables the spark to cause the explo-
sion, i.e.:
Given the presence of the vapor, the spark causes the explosion, but
in the absence of the vapor, there is not an explosion whether or not
the spark occurs.
You can envisage still other circumstances in which the
causal roles of the vapor and spark are interchanged. Suppose,
for example, that an induction coil delivers a spark from time
to time in an enclosed canister. You know that the introduction
of a combustible vapor will cause an explosion. You also know
that the occurrence of the spark allows such an explosion to
occur. It may even occur without the vapor if, say, an explosive
substance such as gunpowder is put into the canister. The
circumstances are as follows:
spark vapor explosion
spark -'vapor explosion
spark -vapor -explosion
-spark vapor -explosion
,spark -vapor -explosion
A description of these circumstances is:
Given the occurrence of the spark, the vapor causes the explosion,
but in the absence of the spark, there is not an explosion whether or
not there is the vapor.
And, once again, this description is not affected by the rare-
ness of the spark or the vapor.
This analysis shows that causes and enabling conditions
are distinct, that they reflect the possibilities in the circum-
stances, and that they are not distinguishable merely on the
grounds of relative rareness. Causes need not be unusual or
abnormal, and they need not be pragmatically relevant to
explanations. It is true that enabling conditions are constant in
some circumstances. But, our preceding examples show that
constancy in the circumstances is not necessary for an enabling
condition. Neither the spark nor the vapor is constant in the
circumstances above, yet their logical roles are distinct, and
one is the enabling condition and the other the cause. What we
can say, however, is that the cause is only effective given the
presence of the enabling condition. Yevgeniya Goldvarg and I
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have shown experimentally that naive individuals distinguish
between causes and enabling conditions in scenarios that par-
allel our examples of sparks, vapors, and explosions.
VI. PROBABILISTIC THEORIES OF CAUSATION
Certain philosophers have proposed that causation is a
probabilistic concept. Reichenbach 7 and others have defended
such a notion, arguing that A causes B if:
p(B I A) > p(B I -A)
where p(B I A) denotes the conditional probability of B given
that A occurs, and p(B I -,A) denotes the conditional probability
of B given that A does not occur. The probabilities can be com-
puted from a distribution of the relative frequencies of the
various possibilities:
A B 28
A -B 3
"A B 10
-A -1B 59
The difference between p(B I A) and p(B I -'A) is markedly posi-
tive (.90 - .14 = .76), and so according to Cheng, A causes B.28
The main evidence for a probabilistic semantics is that
people judge that a causal relation holds in cases, such as the
preceding example, in which the antecedent is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient to bring about the effect. Most people, for
instance, will assent to the proposition:
Smoking causes lung cancer,
even though they know that not everyone who smokes gets the
disease. Such loose generalizations are common in daily life.
See R. REICHENBACH, THE DIRECTION OF TIME (1956).
2 See P.W. Cheng, From Covariation to Causation: A Causal Power Theory,
104 PSYCHOL. REV. 367 (1997).
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Yet most people are also likely to assent to the more accurate
proposition:
Smoking often causes lung cancer.
Readers who agree that this assertion is more accurate have
conceded the main point: if causes were intrinsically
probabilistic, then the two assertions would not differ in accu-
racy.
The probabilistic approach may be justified for scientific
conceptions of causation, especially since the development of
quantum mechanics. But it is implausible as an account of the
meaning of causal relations in everyday life. Our main evi-
dence against a probabilistic meaning for causality is that na-
ive individuals tend to divide cases into those that are possible
and those that are impossible given that A causes B. This re-
sult is contrary to a probabilistic theory, which allows that all
cases are possible: it is their probabilities that matter. Like-
wise, consider the following equal distribution of frequencies:
Sunlight Fertilizer Growth 20
Sunlight -,Fertilizer Growth 20
Sunlight -Fertilizer -Growth 20
,Sunlight Fertilizer -Growth 20
-Sunlight -iFertilizer -'Growth 20
It follows that:
p(Growth j Sunlight) > p(Growth I-iSunlight), i.e., .66 > 0
and:
p(Growth I Fertilizer) > p(Growth I -Fertilizer), i.e., .5 > .33
Hence, both sunlight and fertilizer are causes of growth accord-
ing to the probabilistic account, and sunlight is the stronger
candidate. Yet, as the model theory predicts, individuals judge
sunlight to be the enabling condition and fertilizer to be the
cause. In short, the probabilistic theory obliterates the distinc-
tion between causes and enabling conditions.
Why do people so commonly assent to loose causal general-
izations? One factor may be that they are aware that many
causes in everyday life yield their effects only if the required
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but unknown enabling conditions are present and the poten-
tially disabling conditions are absent (as in the fertilizer exam-
ple). It follows that when people assent to loose generalizations
such as:
Smoking causes cancer,
they are granting that the causal relation holds unless some
enabling condition is absent or some disabling condition is
present.
VII. CAUSAL CHAINS AND CAUSAL FORKS
The great biologist and statistician Sir Ronald Fisher ar-
gued on behalf of the Imperial Tobacco Company that smoking
might not be a cause of lung cancer." He suggested instead
that there could be an unknown gene, X, that both causes you
to smoke and independently causes you to get lung cancer. If
you have the deadly gene, then you are likely to develop the
cancer whether or not you smoke. If you do not have the dead-
ly gene, then you are unlikely to develop the cancer whether or
not you smoke. Ergo, you might as well smoke. A contrasting
view, of course, is that insofar as genes enter the picture there
is a causal chain: the gene causes smoking, and smoking caus-
es cancer. Thus, Fisher defended a causal fork of the form:
Gene ->Smoking
\->Cancer
and his opponents defended a causal chain of the form:
Gene ->Smoking->Cancer
where the arrows denote causation. How can we decide be-
tween these two contrasting accounts?
The computer program implementing the model theory
shows us the differences in the two sets of possibilities corre-
sponding to the chain and to the fork. Thus, given the asser-
tions for the chain of weak causes:
Gene causes smoking.
Smoking causes cancer.
29 See generally RONALD AYLMER FISHER, SMOKING, THE CANCER CONTROVERSY;
SOME ATEMIPTS TO ASSESS THE EVIDENCE (1959).
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the program constructs the following set of possibilities:
Gene Smoking Cancer
-Gene Smoking Cancer
-Gene -Smoking Cancer
,Gene -Smoking -Cancer
In contrast, given the assertions for the causal fork:
Gene causes smoking.
Gene causes cancer.
the program constructs the following possibilities:
Gene Smoking Cancer
-,Gene Smoking Cancer
-Gene Smoking -Cancer
-Gene -Smoking Cancer
,Gene -Smoking -Cancer
The distinction is that the causal fork allows a possibility in
which smoking occurs without cancer. Hence, there is crucial,
though wholly unethical, experiment to decide between the two
possibilities. A random sample of children is divided at random
into two groups in order to ensure a roughly equal distribution
of the gene in the two groups. One group is then forced to
smoke, and the other group is prevented from smoking. The
relative frequencies with which the two groups develop cancer
will determine whether there is a fork or a chain. In Britain,
the decisive evidence came from a study in which doctors gave
up smoking, and it was possible to compare the rate at which
they contracted cancer with the rate in a comparable group
that continued to smoke. Even Fisher did not argue that there
was a gene for giving up smoking in the cause of science.
Bradley Monton has pointed out an interesting set of cir-
cumstances. Consider these possibilities, which are presented
in their temporal order:
First state Second state Third state
-First state -Second state Third state
-First state -Second state -Third state
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What is their correct causal description? According to the mod-
el theory, these circumstances correspond to both a fork:
The first state is a strong cause of the second state, and a weak
cause of the third state.
and to a chain:
The first state is a strong cause of the second state, and the second
state is a weak cause of the third state.
Surprisingly, both descriptions are correct. Hence, temporal
constraints aside, if a first state is the strong cause of a second
state, then any other state that is necessary given the second
state, will be indistinguishable from a state caused by the first
state. We are unable in principle to draw a distinction between
this chain and fork, because it is impossible to have a case in
which the second state does not yield the third state. There
are, therefore, causal descriptions that seem to differ in mean-
ing but that, in fact, are synonymous. They trade on the sub-
tleties of strong causation, which has unforeseen and
counterintuitive consequences.
VIII. CAUSATION AND THE LAW
This paper has described a new theory of causality as it is
conceived by people with no training in philosophy, logic, or
law. The theory provides accounts of what causal relations
mean, of how they are mentally represented, and of how people
make deductive inferences from them. It draws a sharp dis-
tinction between the meaning of causal relations and the evi-
dence that supports them; and it distinguishes between caus-
ing an effect and allowing it to occur, not in terms of their
normality, but in terms of their meanings. It also distinguishes
between weak causation in which a state is sufficient, but not
necessary, to bring about an effect, and strong causation in
which a state is necessary and sufficient to bring about an
effect. If this theory is correct, then many other theories are
wrong. The principal consequences of the theory are that the
meanings of causal relations are determinate, not probabilistic,
and that they concern solely a temporally ordered set of possi-
bilities. The assertion A caused B can accordingly be para-
phrased as A made it impossible for B not to occur. A corollary
is that cause is a transitive relation. The assertion that A al-
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lowed B can be similarly paraphrased as A made it possible for
B to occur. The case for a causal relation depends on observa-
tion, background knowledge, and common sense. None of these
components, however, concern the meaning of the relation, but
merely help us to determine whether or not that meaning is
satisfied by states of affairs. The best test to establish a gener-
al causal relation is a scientific experiment. The best evidence
for a singular causal relation is to show that it is an instance
of a general causal relation.
The chief feature of the theory for legal matters is the
profound difference it draws between the meaning of causal
and enabling relations-a distinction that is robust in the per-
formance of the lay individuals who participated in our experi-
ments. In the past, legal theorists have tended to follow the
line that the distinction is slightly capricious-to use John
Stuart Mill's term3°-and it accordingly appears to be often
overlooked or blurred in legal judgments. Likewise, as Greene
and Darley have shown, 1 the Model Penal Code appears to be
based on assumptions about causation that are at odds with
those of lay individuals. In particular, the Model Penal Code
specifies that to be guilty of murder the accused's actions must
be both the factual and the legal cause of the victim's death.
To be the factual cause, the actions must have been necessary
for the death, which implies that they must be a strong cause:
Actions Death
-Actions -'Death
Legal cause, however, is a puzzling notion. The actions must
lead to the death in a reasonably direct manner so that the
causal relation is not too remote or indirect. Greene and
Darley asked the participants in an experiment to make rat-
ings of a set of scenarios about a murder attempt. The sce-
narios had a common beginning but divergent endings in
terms of, for example, whether the murderous action led to
the victim's death. In fact, the perpetrator's contribution to
the outcome was the strongest predictor of the participants'
ratings of liability. In contrast to the Model Penal Code, the
3o See MILL, supra note 7, at bk. III, ch. v, § 3.
31 See E.J. Greene & J.M. Darley, Effects of Necessary, Sufficient, and Indirect
Causation on Judgments of Criminal Liability, 22 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 429 (1998).
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participants treated actions that were weak causes, i.e., suffi-
cient to bring about the victim's death, as calling for the sever-
est punishment.
Another problematic aspect of causation in law occurs
when courts are asked to determine not whether one state
caused another, but rather whether one individual would have
acted in a different way granted access to certain information.
Thus, Twerski and Cohen 2 have argued that recent decisions
in the law of informed consent have placed courts in an un-
workable situation. Courts have to establish a causal connec-
tion between a doctor's failure to disclose information about a
medical procedure and the patient's decision to undergo the
procedure. The critical relation is whether, if the doctor had
disclosed the risks, the patient would have declined the proce-
dure (decision causation). The courts also have to establish a
causal connection between the procedure and the patient's
subsequent harm (injury causation). The difficulty, as these
authors point out, is to establish what the patient would have
done had he or she known the risks. Psychologists have shown
that the mental processes of decision making are sufficiently
complex that theorists can at best make only actuarial predic-
tions, not predictions about the hypothetical counterfactual
decisions of particular individuals.
The introduction presented three causal vignettes3 that
we will re-examine in order to illustrate how the model theory
can elucidate some puzzles of causation. Consider the recent
case against gun manufacturers:
The defendants, manufacturers of guns, negligently oversupplied
shops in states with weak gun laws. Criminals came into possession
of such guns and murdered relatives of the plaintiffs. Some of the
defendants were found to be the 'proximate' cause of the homicides.
The expression "proximate cause" is used in common law and
in some statutes to bring out the point that it does not suffice
merely to establish that one state is a necessary cause of an-
other. What is meant by "proximate" is as puzzling as the
concept of "legal" cause: perhaps the two denote the same con-
cept. "Proximate cause" evidently does not refer to proximity in
32 See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the
Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607 (1988).
See supra Introduction.
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space or time, or to the most immediate cause in a chain of
causes, though legal theorists have made both these interpre-
tations.34 Moreover, according to the model theory, the defen-
dants were in no way a cause of a homicide. But they may
have made it possible, that is, their negligence may have been
an enabling condition. To prove this contention, you need to
show that if they had not oversupplied guns to shops in states
with weak gun laws, the guns would not have come into the
possession of those criminals who committed the homicides.
That is, you need, at the very least, to show that a homicide
was committed using a gun that the defendants negligently
supplied to a gun shop. Whether this case was established is
unclear. Professor David Yassky was quoted in the Guardian
Weekly to the following effect: "They split the baby. The jurors
found that the industry was negligent in the way it sells and
distributes guns, but they could not find a clear, strong link
between that negligence and specific crimes."35 A more gener-
al concern is whether the law of tort makes a sharp distinction
between negligence that causes harm and negligence that
enables harm to occur. Indeed, the court's decision in the pres-
ent case contrasts starkly with the next case:
The defendant negligently left open an unguarded lift shaft, and a
young lad, knowing that the lift was not there, invited the plaintiff
to step into it. Did the defendant cause the plaintiffs injuries?
In this case, the court followed the traditional view that a
causal connection is negatived by a free action of a third party
who exploits the situation created by the defendant. In fact,
the defendant's negligent action merely enabled the accident to
occur. Hence, the situation is analogous to the gun
manufacturer's negligence. The shopkeepers exploited a situa-
tion created by the defendants and sold the guns to the crimi-
nals. The actions of the shopkeepers therefore might have been
taken to negative the causal connection.
The accused assaulted and raped a woman, who then took poison.
The accused refused to summon medical help and imprisoned her for
" See HART & HONORI, supra note 1, at 86.
" Robert Suro, Gun Makers Guilty of Negligence, GUARDIAN WKLY., Feb. 21,
1999, at 15 (quoting Prof. David Yassky).
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several hours in a hotel room. She died a month later either from
the poison or its effects combined with those of her wounds. Did the
accused cause her death?
This case 6 presents a riddle to causal theorists. One reaction
to the case is, in effect, why should we worry about the precise
causal details of the victim's death when the court has before it
a vicious criminal? Another reaction is that as the viciousness
of intent increases so courts should be prepared to follow the
consequences of an act farther and farther." In fact, the Indi-
ana court affirmed the conviction by a majority of three to two.
The contrasting principle is, again, that if a free and voluntary
act by another actor, who is not in concert with the first, inter-
venes and leads to harm, the first actor is relieved of responsi-
bility. An appeal on this basis was rejected on the grounds that
even if the victim had freely and voluntarily taken the poison,
her wounds inflicted by the accused "actively contributed" to
her death."
The reasoning of the court in this case is odd. There are
several causal questions to be answered. First, what was the
cause of death: the wounds alone, the poison alone, or the two
together? The court evidently decided that it was the two to-
gether. Second, did the behavior of the accused compel the
victim to take the poison, that is, did she have sufficient rea-
son to do so as a consequence of his actions or threats? If she
was compelled, then the accused's actions caused her death.
Third, if she was not compelled to take the poison, did the
accused in preventing access to medical aid cause the victim to
deteriorate in a way that was sufficient to lead to her subse-
quent death? These questions contain some subtleties, as the
36 Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633 (Ind. 1932).
" See HART & HONORt, supra note 1, at 99-100 (relevant citations).
3' See id.
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computer program implementing the model theory demon-
strates. Given an input equivalent to the following proposi-
tions:
The wounds (and threats) caused fear.
Fear caused the victim to take poison.
The poison and delay in medical aid caused death.
the program constructed the following set of possibilities:
Wounds fear poison delay death
Wounds fear poison -'delay death
Wounds fear poison -'delay -'death
and ten more possibilities in which there were no wounds or no
fear. It follows that if the accused caused the wounds and the
delay, they suffice for the victim's death (see the first possibili-
ty). Likewise, it is not necessary to show that the medical aid
would have caused the victim to recover. That demonstration
would be a mistake unless you also showed that it was a
strong cause of recovery. It suffices to show merely that the aid
might have enabled the patient to recover, i.e., with the aid
she might or might not have recovered, but without it, she was
bound to die. Given an input equivalent to the following propo-
sitions:
The accused's action prevented medical aid.
The medical aid allowed recovery.
the program returns the set of possibilities:
Action -aid -recovery
-'Action -'aid -'recovery
-Action aid -recovery
-Action aid recovery
Hence, even though the medical aid would only have made it
possible for the victim to recover, the accused's action never-
theless caused her death in that it prevented her recovery (see
the first possibility). But if the denial of the aid was not a
critical factor in the victim's death, then despite his heinous
actions, the accused was convicted of a crime that he did not
commit.
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IX. GENERAL DISCUSSION
From Mill onwards, philosophers have argued that no
logical distinction exists between causes and enabling condi-
tions. The philosophical tradition has in turn led theorists to
search for some other difference between enabling and causing.
They have proposed many putative distinctions-enabling con-
ditions are normal and causes abnormal, enabling conditions
are common and causes rare, enabling conditions are constant
and causes inconstant, and enabling conditions are
explanatorily uninformative and causes explanatorily informa-
tive. These analyses entered legal theory with Hart and
Honor6's influential study of causation and the law. 9 But, in
fact, there is a genuine logical distinction between causes and
enabling conditions in the circumstances of an observed state,
that is, in the set of alternative possibilities that surround the
state. Consider, for example, a dry match that is struck and
lights. It is not necessary to strike it, because touching it with
a lighted cigarette will do as well. The circumstances corre-
spond to the following possibilities:
dry struck lights
dry -'struck lights
dry -struck -lights
-,dry struck lights
Idry -struck lights
Striking the match and its dryness are logically distinct here:
Given that the match is dry, striking it causes it to light, but if
it is not dry, it cannot be lit whether or not it is struck. Dry-
ness is accordingly the enabling condition, and striking the
match is the cause of it lighting. What determines causal sta-
tus is the circumstances of the state, that is, the set of possibil-
ities as a whole. The distinction between causing and allowing
is, as this paper has shown, not always clear in the law. But
when it is kept in mind, it can help to elucidate otherwise
puzzling phenomena.
"' See id.
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Another misconception about causality is that the meaning
of causal relations depends on a background generalization or
on a framework of explanatory principles. In fact, causal rela-
tions are often justified by such principles, but the meanings of
causal relations make no implicit reference to explanatory
principles. You can therefore make a causal claim that denies
their existence without self-contradiction:
The water was turned into wine by a miracle that defies explana-
tion.
However, the inference from correlation to causation is certain-
ly strengthened by an account of an underlying mechanism or
explanatory principle. The meaning of a causal relation is
distinct from the reasons that justify its induction.
Theorists sometimes argue that causal relations cannot be
deduced, but only induced4 --a misconception that runs in par-
allel with the mistaken view that inferences about probabilities
can only be induced.4' However, a common sort of causal de-
duction occurs when background knowledge implies a causal
interpretation of a state of affairs. You know that an insulin
injection prevents a coma in diabetes, your diabetic friend
gives herself such an injection, and you infer that the injection
prevented her from going into a coma. Granted that individu-
als make causal deductions, theorists might suppose that they
do so relying on laws of thought, that is, formal rules of infer-
ence of some sort. We have seen to the contrary that causal
reasoning can be based on models. The illusory inferences we
reported were predicted by the model theory, but cannot be
explained by formal rules that support only valid deduction.
The morals of our results are twofold. On the one hand,
they substantiate the model theory of causal relations, which is
founded on straightforward assumptions that have been imple-
mented in a computer program. On the other hand, they imply
that theories of legal causation might be reformulated to be in
See Cheng, supra note 28.
41 But see P.N. Johnson-Laird et al., Naive Probability: A Mental Model Theory
of Extensional Reasoning, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 62 (1999).
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closer concordance with how ordinary individuals think about
causation. The advantage of such a foundation is that certain
presently unclear legal notions of causation could be replaced
by a few simple principles. The meanings of causal relations
are sets of possibilities in which an effect cannot precede a
cause. Naive individuals envisage these possibilities in mental
models, and they make causal interpretations using their
knowledge to envisage the circumstances of states of affairs.
They infer the consequences of causal claims from their models
of the premises.

